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Abstract
The Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support protocol
enables mobile networks to change their point of attach-
ment to the Internet, while preserving established sessions
of the nodes within the mobile network. When only a non-
nested mobile network is considered, the so-called triangle
routing is the main problem that should be faced. In Mobile
IPv6, the Route Optimisation mechanism solves this prob-
lem, and the Return Routability mechanism aims to limit the
security concerns originated because of the Route Optimi-
sation. Nowadays Return Routability is considered a weak
solution (i.e., based on strong assumptions). In this arti-
cle we explore different approaches to Route Optimisation
in NEMO and we devise how to adapt some of the Termi-
nal Mobility solutions to a NEMO environment, where, as
we will propose, a delegation of signalling rights from the
Mobile Network Node to the Mobile Router is necessary.
1 Introduction and Problem statement
We are witnessing how the demand for Internet access
in mobile platforms such as trains, buses and ships is con-
stantly increasing. In order to satisfy such demands, the
technical community is working on the design of the re-
quired protocols to provide what has been called Network
Mobility support. In particular, a working group called
NEMO has been created within the IETF [2] to extend the
basic end-host mobility support protocol, MIP [12] [9], to
provide network mobility support.
In more precise terms, a Network that Moves (NEMO) -
a mobile network - can be defined as a network whose at-
tachment point to the Internet varies with time. The router
within the NEMO that connects to the Internet is called the
Mobile Router (MR). It is assumed that the NEMO has
a Home Network where it resides when it is not moving.
Since the NEMO is part of the Home Network, the Mobile
Network has configured addresses belonging to an address
block assigned to the Home Network. These addresses re-
main assigned to the NEMO when it is away from home.
Naturally, these addresses only have topological meaning
when the NEMO is at home. When the NEMO is away from
home, packets addressed to the Mobile Network Nodes
(MNNs) will still be routed to the Home Network. Addi-
tionally, when the NEMO is away from home, i.e., it is in a
visited network, the MR acquires an address from the vis-
ited network, called the Care-of Address (CoA), where the
routing architecture can deliver packets without additional
mechanisms.
The goal of the network mobility support mechanisms is
to preserve established communications between the MNNs
and external Correspondent Nodes (CNs) through move-
ment. Packets of such communications will be addressed
to the MNNs addresses, which belong to the Mobile Net-
work Prefix (MNP), so additional mechanisms to forward
packets between the Home Network and the NEMO are
needed. The basic solution for network mobility support [7]
essentially creates a bi-directional tunnel between a special
node located in the Home Network of the NEMO (the Home
Agent), and the Care-of Address of the MR (Fig. 1).
This solution is derived from the solution proposed for
host mobility support, MIPv6 [9], without including the
Route Optimisation support. Actually, the protocol is sim-
ilar and the existing Binding Update (BU) message is ex-
tended to inform the Home Agent (HA) about the IP ad-
dress of the NEMO side of the tunnel (that is, the CoA of
the MR), through which the HA has to forward the packets
addressed to the Mobile Network Prefix.
When only a non-nested NEMO is considered, the so-
called triangle routing1 is the main problem that should be
faced (see Fig. 1). In Mobile IPv6, this problem has been
solved using a Route Optimisation mechanism, which al-
lows a Mobile Node to update the information about its cur-
rent location (i.e., its Care-of Address) on the Correspon-
dent Nodes, therefore enabling the traffic to bypass the HA,
but still using some kind of encapsulation/overhead (i.e., the
1This term, used because of historical reasons, can lead to confusion.
The path experimented by the packets is not triangular, but actually angu-
lar: CN< − >HA< − >MR< − >MNN
Figure 1. Triangular routing
use of the Home Address Destination Option and the Type
2 Routing Header), needed to provide a mobility support
transparent to the layers above IP.
A mechanism, named Return Routability (RR) [11], was
specified by the MIPv6 Route Optimisation security design
team with the aim of limiting the security concerns orig-
inated because of the Route Optimisation. Basically, this
mechanism verifies that there is a node that is able to re-
spond to packets sent to a given address. This mechanism
can be deceived only if the routing infrastructure is com-
promised or if there is an attacker between the verifier and
the address to be verified. With these exceptions, the test
is used to ensure that the MN’s Home Address (HoA) and
MN’s Care-of Address (CoA) are collocated.
It is known that in different contexts there have been
doubts about the goodness of the Return Routability mecha-
nism. An important fact is that many mobile operators seem
to be reluctant to use a solution based on RR as compared
to ”strong cryptography” to protect the location informa-
tion updates (i.e., Binding Updates sent to Correspondent
Nodes) in their Mobile IPv6 deployments. Essentially the
RR is considered a ”weak security mechanism” and it is ac-
cused of introducing a non-negligible burden of signalling
in the network, which is a relevant handicap in links where
resources are scarce (i.e., the wireless access link from a
NEMO to the infrastructure). This poses an important chal-
lenge for the solution of the Route Optimisation problem
in NEMO environments, and brings up the need of study-
ing new mechanisms to adequately secure (integrity protec-
tion & source authentication) the communication between a
MNN and a CN.
A strong cryptography approach to protect Binding Up-
dates must be based on a security association between the
two nodes participating in the communication (i.e., MNN
and CN). When signalling messages (e.g., Binding Up-
dates) are sent, the problem is then how to efficiently cre-
ate a security association between these nodes. Some so-
lutions have been already proposed to solve that in Mo-
bile IPv6 (i.e., a Terminal Mobility scenario). We consider
the following important solutions: solutions based on the
availability of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), solutions
based on the use of Cryptographically Generated Addresses
(CGAs) [4] [8], and solutions based on Crypto Based Host
Identifiers (CBHIs) [13].
In this article we explore different approaches to Route
Optimisation in non-nested NEMOs and we devise how to
adapt some of the Terminal Mobility solutions to a NEMO
environment, where as we will propose, a delegation of sig-
nalling rights from the MNN to the MR is necessary.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in sec-
tion 2 different approaches to Route Optimisation in non-
nested NEMOs are analysed. In section 3, three different
approaches to the delegation of signalling rights, adapted
for using strong cryptography to protect the Route Optimi-
sation, are devised. Finally, section 4 is devoted to conclu-
sions.
2 Route Optimisation in non-nested NEMOs
In this section, different approaches to mitigate/solve the
problem of the triangle routing in NEMOs are presented and
analysed.
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2.1 End-to-end Route Optimisation
A first approach to solve the triangle routing issue is to
perform an end-to-end management of the Route Optimi-
sation (RO). When a whole NEMO moves (i.e., the MR
changes its point of attachment to the fixed Internet), every
MNN inside the NEMO that supports this sort of end-to-end
RO has to update its location information on all the CNs it
is communicating with (see Fig. 2).
Without any doubt, performing source address authenti-
cation would be the easier approach. TheMNN by itself can
demonstrate, using one of the different proposed schemes
(e.g., a PKI certificate, or a CGA), that it owns its address
(HoA). Nevertheless this approach presents the following
drawbacks:
• Signalling (e.g., Binding Update) bursts. These storms
can lead to congestions and drops, and would usually
involve wasting scarce bandwidth in wireless environ-
ments.
• The MNN has to be mobility-capable (i.e., implement
the Mobile IPv6 protocol), which is, in general, an un-
desired requirement in a NEMO. This makes more dif-
ficult the deployment of mobile networks because it
prevents the non-aware NEMO nodes taking advantage
of the RO.
• In each visited network, a CoA per MNN in the NEMO
is needed, whereas with the NEMO Basic Solution [7]
just one CoA is needed to support the mobility of the
whole NEMO.
• Without extra mechanisms, the MNNs are not aware of
the movement of the NEMO (i.e., the moments when
the NEMO changes its point of attachment to the In-
ternet). So, unless additional procedures are provided,
MNNs cannot know when they have to send the loca-
tion update signalling.
2.2 MR-CN Route Optimisation
There are several good reasons to let the Mobile Router
in the NEMO to send the signalling on behalf of the MNNs
belonging to that NEMO. In this case, whenever a MNN-
CN RO is needed, the MR sends a Binding Update to the
CN binding the MNN’s HoA to the MR’s CoA (see Fig. 3)
[5].
This approach has the following characteristics. First,
the solution is applicable to nodes without mobility sup-
port. Second, the signalling overhead within the NEMO
is eliminated, improving the overall performance. This is
specially important when the NEMO is composed of Ad-
Hoc nodes (i.e., the NEMO is a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network -
MANET [6]).
In order to let the MR send the location update signalling
on behalf of the MNN, a delegation of the signalling rights
to the MR is needed. To be able to send the signalling on
behalf of the MNNs in a secure way, the MNNs have to
delegate their signalling rights to the MR, i.e., some proce-
dure must be carried out to allow the MR to send signalling
messages on behalf of a MNN, in a way that enables the
CN to verify that the MR is actually allowed to send this
signalling. We should remark that Mobile Nodes visiting a
NEMO, i.e., VisitingMobile Nodes (VMNs), cannot benefit
of the secure Route Optimisation provided by this approach
(i.e., the MR performing the RO on behalf of the MNNs),
because a delegation of the signalling rights between a MR
and a MNN belonging to different administrative domains
may not be easily deployed.
The delegation of signalling rights to authenticate BUs
can solve the identity attacks (e.g., an attacker that claims
to own a stolen address). Nevertheless, it cannot solve the
location attacks (e.g., an attacker that claims to be located
at a certain place). A possibility that has been suggested
in Mobile IPv6 and that may be also applicable to the the
NEMO scenario would be performing the Return Routabil-
ity procedure once per handover [8].
3 Approaches to the delegation
In this section we analyse different solutions proposed to
use strong cryptography in the signalling of Mobile IPv6,
and how to adapt them to a NEMO environment in which
a delegation of signalling rights from the MNN to the MR
is necessary. This kind of mechanisms is essential to allow
the deployment of Mobile Networks solutions in real envi-
ronments. A general analysis to Delegation of Signalling
Rights can be found in [10].
3.1 Delegation based on PKI certificates
As a first approach, the delegation may be expressed in
the form of certificates generated by a PKI. This general
concept can be easily adapted to be used in NEMO. Basi-
cally, the PKI assigns prefix certificates to MRs, binding a
MR public key to a NEMO Mobile Network Prefix.
CERT = (MNP, K MR+)
Basically, the certificate states that the MR owning the
public key K MR+ is authorised to bind a CoA to a HoA
with network prefix MNP. This certificate is signed by a
Certification Authority.
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Figure 2. MNN-CN end-to-end Route Optimisation
3.1.1 Procedure of operation
• The MR obtains a certificate from the PKI, containing
the Mobile Network Prefixes associated to the MR.
• Each Binding Update sent by theMR to a CN on behalf
of a MNN is signed with the MR’s private key. The
message also contains the MR’s prefix certificate.
• The Correspondent Node, when receiving a Binding
Update, obtains the prefix certificate associated with
the HoA contained in the BU, and verifies it. If the
Binding Update is valid, the CN adds an entry in its
Binding Cache.
3.1.2 Analysis of the solution
In this approach, a high protection against identity attacks is
provided, but the major drawback of this solution is the re-
quirement of a global key infrastructure, which is an unreal-
istic requirement for the whole Internet nowadays (although
it is a solution feasible in more restricted environments).
Using prefix certificates introduces the non-trivial issue
of the Prefix Ownership and this problem is much more
complex than the basic Address Ownership issue that arises
with Mobile IP.
3.2 Delegation based on self-signed certificates
In this case, the MNN is assumed to have a Cryptograph-
ically Generated Address (CGA) as its HoA. As described
in [13], a CGA is an IPv6 address, which contains a set of
bits generated by hashing the IPv6 address owner’s public
key. This property allows the user to provide a ”proof of
ownership” of its IPv6 address. On the other hand the MR
(i.e., delegate) has a certificate as follows:
CERT = (CGA, K MR+)
Basically, the certificate states that the MR owning the
public key K MR+ is authorised to bind a CoA to the CGA
(MNN’s HoA) included in the certificate. In other words,
the MNN, identified by the CGA, delegates the right to send
Binding Updates (location update messages) to a trusted
node, the delegate, identified by K MR+. This certificate is
signed with the MNN’s private key associated to the CGA
(K MNN-).
3.2.1 Procedure of operation
In this scenario, whenever a MNN-CN RO is needed, the
MR performs it on behalf of the MNN and sends to the CN
4
Figure 3. MR-CN Route Optimisation
a location update message (BU) linking the MNN’s HoA to
a CoA. The process is the following: the Binding Update is
signed with the MR’s private key and it includes the certifi-
cate. When the CN receives this location update message,
it first verifies the certificate using the MNN’s public key
associated to the CGA (HoA of the BU) and then it verifies
the received message using the MR’s public key (K MR+),
included in the certificate.
3.2.2 Analysis of the solution
The main advantages of this approach are the following:
• It does not require the deployment of a PKI infras-
tructure. This is a crucial point because assuming the
availability of a global PKI infrastructure is not very
realistic in large networks (e.g., Internet), at least not
nowadays.
• On the other hand it would be potentially compatible
with SEND [3].
Also, some drawbacks can be pointed out:
• The solution is not transparent for the CN, i.e., any CN
must understand the address format and the procedures
involved, which requires changes to the software of the
CN.
3.3 Implicit Delegation
In this approach to delegation of signalling rights, there
is not an explicit delegation from the Mobile Network Node
to the Mobile Router. Instead, the MNN gives to the MR
the right to send signalling on its behalf by accepting the
use of an address with a particular structure (the format of
this address is proposed in [13]).
3.3.1 Address format
This address (an IPv6 address) is composed of the network
prefix (64 bits) and the Interface Identifier (64 bits). The
network prefix is simply the Mobile Network Prefix. The
Identifier (IID) is called a Crypto Based Host Identifier [13]
and is created in the following way:
IID = [4 control bits, 48 bit site identifier, 12 host bits]
The format for this IID is proposed and described in [13].
The 4 control bits are: one reserved, one to distinguish be-
tween 80 bit identifiers and 64 bit identifiers (in this appli-
cation we are only interested in 64 bit identifiers), and the
usual universal/local bit and group bit. To ensure EUI-64
compatibility, [13] proposes to set the u/l bit to ”universal”
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and the group bit to indicate a group address. Because we
have 12 host bits, we will be able to address 212 = 4096
hosts, which seems to be large enough for a NEMO.
The site identifier contains cryptographic information
that allows Correspondent Nodes to verify that the address
is used legitimately. The site identifier must contain
the following information (this is different from what is
proposed in [13] because of the reasons explained in next
section):
NEMO Site identifier = Hash (Mobile Network Prefix,
MR public key)
3.3.2 Procedure of operation
A MR willing to serve a NEMO by sending the signalling
on behalf of its MNNs, must generate a pair of keys:
public/private. Then, it generates and provides addresses
(Home Addresses or HoAs) to the MNNs. The addresses
have the format explained in the previous section.
If the MR wants to send a Binding Update on behalf of a
MNN of its NEMO to a Correspondent Node, the MR signs
the BU with its own private key. The MR also informs the
Correspondent Node of its public key and Mobile Network
Prefix (that must match that of the HoA included in the BU).
The CN can verify the address by re-calculating the Site
Identifier (it has the MR public key and the NEMO Mobile
Network Prefix) and checking that it matches that of the
HoA. Using the MR public key, the CN can also verify the
authenticity of the BU.
An attacker cannot generate a fake BU that binds a cer-
tain HoA to a CoA. To be able to do that, the attacker would
need to authenticate the BU with a private key that corre-
sponds to the public key used to create the Site Identifier of
the HoA.
An attacker can also try to generate pairs of pub-
lic/private keys and create a dictionary of 248 different Site
Identifiers. Then, if the attacker detects a particular HoA
that she wants to attack, she only has to look up in the
dictionary the public/private key corresponding to the Site
Identifier of the HoA. Using the Mobile Network Prefix in
the calculation of the Site Identifier makes this attack much
more difficult, because the dictionary must include not only
Site Identifiers but also network prefixes: 248 ∗ 264 entries.
Notice that in this section we focused on the conceptual
ideas of this solution, a practical situation would use some
improvements, for example a symmetric key could be gen-
erated from the public/private key for doing authentications
less computationally costly. Also, the particular hash algo-
rithm or public key cipher method are not analysed.
3.3.3 Analysis of the solution
The main advantage of this delegation solution is that
is very simple. Nevertheless some disadvantages can be
pointed out:
1. It is incompatible with stateless address auto-
configuration and other solutions that work with the
IID as CGAs (what can have a negative effect in SEND
for example).
2. The solution is not transparent for the CN, i.e., any CN
must understand the address format and the procedures
involved, which requires changes to the software of the
CN.
3. It imposes a limit of 212 to the number of hosts in a
NEMO. This does not seem to be a great problem for a
NEMO. A solution for this would be to use more than
one prefix in the NEMO (this, of course, uses address
space).
4 Conclusions and Final Remarks
In this paper we have analysed the need of a delegation
of signalling rights in those environments in which a Route
Optimisation for NEMO using strong cryptography is a re-
quirement.
The delegation of signalling rights can be done in an ex-
plicit way, by means of authorisation certificates, or, as it
has been devised here, in an implicit way, accepting the use
of an address with some particular characteristics.
Probably, the simplest solution, implicit delegation, has
also more limitations (as incompatibilities with other mech-
anisms like SEND or stateless address auto-configuration).
The most flexible solution, the one based on PKI certifi-
cates, requires an important infrastructure. The solution
based on CGAs can be a good compromise between com-
plexity and flexibility. The solutions to be used in real de-
ployments are very much dependant on operators prefer-
ences.
A handicap for delegation of signalling rights is that, ir-
respective of the approach followed, it is not transparent for
Correspondent Nodes, i.e., it requires changes to the soft-
ware of the Correspondent Nodes, which pose an important
difficulty for its deployment.
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